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Trade Union Power and the 
Process of Economie Development 
The Kenyan Example 
J. Douglas Muir and John L. Brown 
In this paper, the authors discuss some of the policy 
alternatives available to a Government and a union move-
ment and consider in détail the alternative chosen by one 
African country, Kenya. Moreover they examine how the 
Government has sought to reconcile its économie develop-
ment objectives with granting unions such traditional free-
doms as the right to strike, the right to bargaîn collectively 
and the right of free association. In doing so they discuss 
the development of labour législation in Kenya and examine 
its effects upon the strike weapon as a source of union 
power and the effect of strikes on the Kenya economy. 
Finaïly they offer some spéculations on futur trends of 
industrial relations in Kenya. 
INTRODUCTION 
Ail Governments restrict the activities of unions, but the degree of 
restriction and the form it takes varies widely from country to country. 
One factor which has been con- |
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sidered of prime importance in de-
termining the restrictions placed 
upon unions is the level of éco-
nomie development a country has 
attained. It has been argued that a 
strong trade union movement will 
retard the growth of developing 
countres and, therefore, severe 
* This study is being jointly financed by the University of Nairobi and the 
Canadian International Development Agency. 
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controls should be placed upon wages, the right to strike, freedom to 
organize and the use of collective bargaining.1 This point of view has 
been strongly criticized, and others argue that unions can hâve a positive 
effect because they may assist in the formation of a stable and effective 
labour force. 2 However, even proponents of this point of view do not 
argue for a total absence of restrictions on unions. Thus the question of 
the degree and form of restrictions that should be placed upon unions 
in developing countries still remains. 
In this paper we shall discuss some of the policy alternatives available 
to a Government and a union movement and consider in détail the alter-
native chosen by one African country — Kenya. We shall examine how 
the Government has sought to reconcile its economic development ob-
jectives with granting unions such traditional freedoms as the right to 
strike, the right to bargain collectively and the right of free association. 
In doing so we discuss the development of labour législation in Kenya 
and examine its effect upon the strike weapon as a source of union power 
and the effect of strikes on the Kenya economy. Finally, we will offer 
some spéculations on future trends in industrial relations in Kenya. 
Kenya provides an excellent opportunity for the study of trade 
unionism in a developing economy. It has a well established union move-
ment and is attempting to develop a modem industrial sector as rapidly 
as possible. After more than half a century of British colonial rule, 
Kenya is politically stable and has now been independent for a décade. 
This offers a sufficient period to examine the effects of Government policy 
on the union movement. Therefore, in this paper we shall concentrate 
upon the décade since Independence achieved in 1963. 
Alternative Rôles for Trade Unions in Development 
In any country the rôle or function of trade unions and their relation-
ship with the government is usually closely related. The degree to which 
trade unions décide to function in opposition to the policies of government 
détermines, to a large extent, the nature of the relationship between the 
unions and the government. It is suggested that the extent to which labour 
1
 W. Arthur LEWIS, « Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labour, » The Manchester School of Economic Studies, May 1954, pp. 139-191, 
2
 See for example Everett KASSALOW, « Labor in Development : A Critique 
of some Current Concepts, » Industrial Relations Research Association, Annual 
Proceedings, 1969 and Paul FISHER « The Economic Rôle of Unions in less De-
veloped Areas, » Industrial Relations Research Association Spring Meeting, 1961. 
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législation is restrictive dépends upon the relationship between the unions 
goals and government policy. As a resuit of a conflict in thèse goals and 
policies, trade unions in many countries hâve either been brought directly 
under government controls or hâve been forced to operate within very 
restrictive législation. Even in those countries where there is a close re-
lationship between the government and the union (such as when the 
Labour Party was in power in Britain) the governments hâve used this 
close relationship to either remove some of the union's independent bar-
gaining rights or to impose some form of wage freeze and other bar-
gaining limitations. 
Thus unions in the developing countries must clearly décide what 
function they are going to fulfill in relation to the policies of the govern-
ment. Paul Fisher suggests that such unions are only left with one of 
three alternatives — either become instruments of the state ; join the 
opposition and fight against government policies ; or accept a policy of 
wage restraint and function as best as possible within the established 
restrictive législation.3 In addition, Fisher cautions that the patriotic 
approach of accepting a policy of wage restraint is difficult for a union 
to maintain over long periods of time and will likely lead to the colapse 
of the union or to its takeover by a more militant group. 4 To this Sturm-
thal cautions that unions dérive their power from the defence of the short 
run économie interests of their members and therefore they cannot exist 
for long periods of time as social welfare agencies and even less as instru-
ments of wage restraint. 5 Thus the dilemma of the trade unions in the 
developing countries is quite clear. It is sort of a damned-if-you-do-and-
damned-if-you-do-not situation. 
A number of writers hâve presented « solutions » to this dilemna. 
As often happens, most of thèse suggestions are conflicting. For example 
Asoka Mehta has prescribed the transformation of the Indian labour 
unions into harmless, or at least economically inexpensive, productionist 
mechanisms.6 Professors John Dunlop, Walter Galenson and Adolf 
Sturmthal are unanimous in objecting to this suggestion. Dunlop has 
even suggested that it would be better not to hâve any union for at least 
3 FISHER, Op. cit. 
4 lbid. 
5 Adolf STURMTHAL, « Unions and Economie Development, » Economie 
Development and Cultural Change, January 1960. 
6
 Asoka MEHTA, « The Mediating Rôle of the Trade Union in Underdeveloped 
Countries » Economie Development and Cultural Change, October, 1957, pp. 16-23. 
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a time or to hâve a union operating under restrictive législation. 7 Sturm-
thal has left us with a « choice between permitting some measure of 
effective unionism and delaying economic growth, or supressing demo-
cracy altogether for the sake of maximum development ».8 This, he 
suggests is another way of expressing the alternative as between « per-
missive and totalitarian methods of dealing with labour unions ».9 Walter 
Galenson is perhaps the most realistic when he sugests that a balance 
must be struck which both satisfies the requirements of the economic plan-
ner and the minimum demands of the industrial worker.10 Sturmthal sug-
gests that the nature of such a compromise must corne in the form of the 
union delaying their push for a wage increase or accepting postponement 
of its effective date so as to give the economy time for its « initial invest-
ment push ». The other side of this compromise consists of the govern-
ment accepting a slight delay in its capital formation drive as «the price 
to be paid to divert a further détérioration of the prospects for economic 
growth that might otherwise be caused by political or social upheavals ». n 
The Rôle of the Trade Unions: A Viewpoint 
While the above arguments set out the alternatives they do neglect 
to consider the processes by which a country might arrive at any parti-
cular alternative. The arguments are often presented in the context of an 
idealized country that has neither industry, nor trade unions. In many 
cases this is not true. Most developing countries were colonies, and at the 
time of Independence the new Governments inherited an industrial base, 
sometimes beyond the take-off stage, and a number of aîready esta-
blished institutions. Often one of thèse institutions was an established 
union movement. To wipe it out and proceed as if it never existed is 
a policy fraught with danger. How to deal with it will dépend upon such 
things as the cultural context and the historical background that produced 
the union movement. 
Also it has been pointed out that ail too often the négative aspects 
of unionism hâve been considered to the neglect of potential benefits. 
The resuit is an excess emphasis on législation to restrict unions. However, 
7
 John T. DUNLOP, American Labour's Rôle in less Developed Countries, 
Ithaca, Cornell University, 1959, p. 18. 
8 STURMTHAL, op cit., p. 199. 
9 Ibid. 
!0 Walter GALENSON, Labour and Economic Development, New York, John 
Willey, 1969, p . 14 
H STURMTHAL, op. cit., p. 204. 
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if it is granted that unions may benefit the process of development, at-
tention can also be paid to the use of législation to strenghen unions. As 
Fisher has pointed out thèse measures are often minor and not intended 
to develop strong unions, but merely to provide économie relief.12 Still, 
the potential for législation to assist unions as well as restrict them re-
mains. 
Finally, the question must be raised, is a Government's opposition 
to the development of trade unions really based on économie or political 
grounds ? The answer to this question is important because there is no 
use in developing an argument on économie grounds if the real reason 
for opposition is political. 
In broad terms the unions and the Government in Kenya hâve been 
following a policy similar to Fisher's third alternative of working within 
government restrictions. However, in doing so it might be argued that 
the respective parties hâve been aware of the need for some form of 
compromise, as Galenson has suggested. That is in agreeing to work 
within thèse restrictions the unions hâve sometimes been able to achieve 
benefits that hâve assisted in their organization. Our objective in the 
remainder of this paper is to examine how the présent situation in Kenya 
developed, and discuss the conséquences for the trade union movement. 
BACKGROUND OF THE KENYAN LABOUR MOVEMENT 
An understanding of the current rôle, function and power of the 
trade unions in Kenya is somewhat dépendent upon an appréciation of 
the unions' development problems. As such, the following section of this 
paper is designed to provide some brief background information concern-
ing the Kenyan trade union movement. It is, in no way intended to be 
a définitive historical discussion. 
The Colonial Period 
Both prior to, and during the Second World War, the Kenya Colonial 
Government was openly opposed to the development of a trade union 
movement. In fact, despite a 1930 directive from the British Colonial 
Office to do so, it was not until 1943 that a statute was passed which 
recognized trade unions in Kenya. AU législation prior to this time was 
of a répressive nature and designed to provide the Government with 
12 FISHER, op. cit. 
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powers to control unionism. This is not to suggest that unions did not 
exist prior to this time. One can trace a séries of workers protests and 
strikes starting from the first strike on the construction of the railway in 
1900. During this period a number of trade unions were formed but their 
effective life was generally quite short. 
After World War II the British Labour Government, the British 
TUC, the American AFL and CIO, the ICFTU ail took an active interest 
in problems of the workers in Africa. As such the fledgelling trade union 
movement in Kenya received considérable external help in the form 
of finance, éducation, training and advice. In addition, the officiai go-
vernment policy in Kenya after the war shifted toward the fostering of 
trade unions. The primary concern of the Government during this post-
war period was to restrict union activities to economic and industrial 
problems and to keep them out of political areas. It was at this time that 
Jomo Kenyatta and others were starting their call for independence, 
and often it was difficult to really differentiate between trade union 
economic activities and African independence activities. In many cases 
the leaders were the same and the techniques employée were similar. The 
mixture of goals is shown by the East African Trade Union Congress 
1950 May Day pledge that « our unions and the EATUC would do their 
utmost for the achievement of workers' demands, complète freedom and 
independence of the East African territories and lasting peace ».13 
In an attempt to deter the development of trade unions during the 
early 1950s the Government : (a) sponsored the establishment of staff 
associations and works' committees to try to eliminate the need for unions 
at the shop level, (b) established statutory wage détermination machinery 
by forming wages council for various industries and thereby try to elim-
inate the need for unions, (c) provided close control over the internai 
activities of the unions through the Registrar of Trade Unions with 
powers to de-register the unions, and (d) extended compulsory arbi-
tration and other restrictions to almost ail major industries through a 
libéral application of the Essential Services Ordinance. Thus, although 
the Government was overtly following a policy of union récognition it 
was also actively detering the development of the unions. 
The Kenyan independence drive entered the revolutionary Mau Mau 
stage and a state of emergency was declared in 1952. There was a fear 
13 Makham SINGH, History of Kenya's Trade Union Movement to 1952, 
Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969, p. 202. 
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that the unions either were, or soon would be, under Mau Mau influence. 
As such the Emergency régulations reduced the unions to mère shells. It 
was only the financial support by the ICFTU that maintained the Kenya 
Fédération of Registered Trade Unions, (renamed Kenya Fédération of 
Labour in 1955) and it was only the political pressure from the ICFTU, 
the British TUC and the British Colonial Office which prevented the 
Government from banning the KFL. Thus the trade union movement was 
significantly weakened during the 1952-58 period and its activities were 
generally restricted to non-political affairs. Although towards the end of 
this period Tom Mboya (the General Secretary of KFL) again began 
leading the union activities more and more back into the political area. 
An important point in trade union development occurred in 1958 
when the Fédération of Kenya Employers and the Kenya Fédération of 
Labour entered into a récognition agreement. The FKE agreed to re-
cognize and bargain with the unions and the KFL agreed to an industrial 
basis of organization. This agreement did much to foster the develop-
ment of the unions as they now exist and resulted in the unions having 
to rely less upon the Government. Despite the 1958 agreement the unions 
faced severe problems in organizing the many small enterprises in the 
country. The unions lacked the organizational ability and finances to 
overcome the small employers opposition. As such, industrial unrest con-
tinued until it reached its ail time height of 285 strikes in 1962. A num-
ber of thèse strikes can be related to the imminence of Independence 
which came in December 1963. 
The Independence Period 
Prior to the actual granting of independence, an African coalition 
government was established in April 1962. Tom Mboya became the Min-
ister of Labour. In an attempt to promote industrial peace Mboya con-
vened a tripartite committee which drew up an Industrial Charter. Ac-
cording to this charter management reaffirmed that it would recognize 
and bargain with the unions and the unions committed themselves to 
reducing the number of industrial disputes by following the established 
machinery. This Charter considerably assisted the spread of unionism 
in Kenya and the continuation of the System of industrial relations which 
had already been established. 
Another important developement occurred in 1962. Without going 
into the détails, a confrontation developed in the political élections which 
preceded independence. Much of this confrontation involved the question 
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of trade union sponsorship of its own candidates. The end resuit was a 
décision that the unions would not enter candidates or behave as political 
parties. This décision avoided much government opposition and is a 
policy which has been followed to date. 
Much of the immédiate post-independence labour unrest was attri-
buted to the rivalries which developed between the two fédérations of 
labour that existed. In order to restore unity in the labour movement and 
to negate international unions influence, Président Kenyatta (by Presi-
dential decree in 1965) deregistered both the KFL and the KAWC and 
established a single organization — the Central Organization of Trade 
Unions (COTU). In addition he cancelled ail affiliations by unions with 
bodies outside Kenya. COTU's constitution was drawn up by the At-
torney-General's Department and entrenched government supervision of 
COTU's internai affairs. At this time COTU and its leaders pledged 
loyalty to the Government and support of the governing party.14 This 
pledge has since been reaffirmed. 
Since 1966 there hâve been two sets of élections within COTU — 
1969 and 1972-73. Both thèse élections hâve been fraught with severe 
internai difficulties resulting from clashes of personality, ideology, tri-
balism etc. The resuit has been that the single « house » of labour has 
not really been in good order since its establishment. Thus while the indi-
vidual trade unions hâve been growing in size, strength and maturity 
the same cannot really be said for COTU itself. As a resuit the individual 
unions hâve really been operating on their own without much assistance 
or support from COTU. 
STRUCTURE OF THE KENYAN UNION MOVEMENT 
The trade unions in Kenya are represented to the government and 
to outside bodies by the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU). 
By 1972 COTU was an association of 28 of Kenya's 30 major and distinct 
national unions.15 As with most national trade union centres, the basic 
14 COTU, A Statement of Policy, Nairobi, COTU, Nov. 8, 1966. 
15 Depending upon the définition of « trade union » used, there may be 35 or 
more «unions». However, thèse others are either professional bodies difficult to 
differentiate from management or are staff associations. It should be noted that 
the two largest unions (Kenya Civil Servants' Union and the Kenya National 
Union of Teachers) representing 37% of the union movement were removed from 
COTU by Government order in 1968. 
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functions of COTU are (a) to assist, service and co-ordinate the activities 
of its affiliâtes, and (b) to represent the affiliâtes' interests before govern-
ment and other outside bodies. Franckly, COTU has not been very ef-
fective over the past two years as a resuit of tribal rivalries and other 
internai problems. Most of the trade unions do not consider COTU an 
effective source of assistance, particularly in the areas of collective bar-
gaining and dispute seulement. 
Each of the 30 national unions is organized on an industrial basis. 
As a resuit, there are very few jurisdictional or other problems between 
the national unions. The basic function and activities of ail unions is to 
organize workers, bargain collectively and to handle workers' disputes 
and grievances. To accomplish thèse activities ail of the unions rely upon 
Shop Stewards and Branch Secretaries to organize and recruit members 
as well as to, initially at least, handle workers' grievances. Gênerally 
speaking, the power of most of thèse unions is highly centralized in the 
hands of the General Secretaries. In ail cases the General Secretary is the 
chief executive officer of the unions and, such, the union's highest ad-
ministrative and executive officiai. In a number of the unions he is also 
the only full time employed officiai. He generally handles ail the col-
lective bargaining and major grievance responsibilities for the union ; 
represents the union to its members and to the public ; effectively con-
trols ail union expenditures and dominâtes policy formulation. It should 
be noted that most of thèse General Secretaries are capable men with 
qualities and qualifications significantly superior to most others in their 
union. In addition, they are reasonably secure in their office, with two-
thirds of them having a tenure in office in excess of 5 years. Thèse Per-
sonal attributes plus the importance of his responsibilities lead to the 
concentration of power within the unions. 
In Kenya trade union membership size can be obtained since ail 
unions are required to file a return each year with the Registrar of Trade 
Unions. There is, however, the problem of differentiating between « dues 
paying > members and « book » members. Some unions hâve a very large 
book membership but in fact may hâve a relatively small dues paying 
membership.16 For our purposes we hâve used dues paying membership. 
Table 1 reports both the actual trade union membership size as well as 
16
 The guides and porters in the Game and Hunting Workers union only pay 
dues when they work and therefore only a small portion of the book membership 
actually pays dues at any one time. The situation is similar in the Plantation Workers 
Union and some of the other unions. 
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membership size as a percentage of the total paid work force for the period 
since Independence. This data leads us to conclude that, on the basis 
of membership size, the trade unions are relatively strong in Kenya. As 
an institution, they are well established throughout the modem sector of 
the economy. As such, neither the govemment nor the employers can 
ignore a trade union movement which has organized more than forty 
per cent of the total paid work force. 
Year 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 * 
Source : Registrar of Trade Unions, Annual Returns from Each Union. 
* Provisional 
Obviously size alone is not an adéquate measure of the strength of 
the trade union movement. To provide an indication of the financial 
strength of the Kenyan trade union movement, we hâve examined the 
audited financial statement required from each union by the Registrar 
of Trade Unions over the period 1963-1972. The current expenditure and 
gross as-sets per union member are reported in Table 2. 
Under the check-off system n the employer remits 85% of the dues 
collected to the union's national headquarters and 15% direct to COTU 
(K). Thus the unions hâve no control over the funds going to COTU 
and, with very few exceptions, ail union funds are closely controlled by 
TABLE 1 
ie Union Mem ibership 1963 1972 
Total 
Membership 
Total 
Total 
Membership as a 
Percentage of 
Paid Work Force 
118,788 22 
172,763 30 
204,211 35 
214,576 36 
234,701 39 
233,618 37 
233,168 36 
258,721 38 
307,550 43 
17
 It should be noted that, in almost ail the unions, the monthly dues are three 
shillings. In addition, the unions are no longer bothered with the difficult task of 
collecting dues from each member individually. Since 1965 every establishment 
with 5 or more union members must check off and remit the dues to the union. 
However any form of membership security, such as a union shop, is illégal. 
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TABLE 2 
Current Expenditudes and Assets per Trade Union Member — 1963-1972 
Current Expenditures Current Assets 
Year Per Member ($ CAN.) Per Member ( 
1963 2.19 .58 
1964 2.03 .39 
1965 2.18 .44 
1966 2.60 .55 
1967 3.35 .68 
1968 3.45 1.06 
1969 3.44 1.14 
1970 4.43 1.32 
1971 4.50 1.79 
1972* 3.95 2.87 
Source : Registrar of Trade Unions, Annual Returns 1963-1972. 
* Provisional 
the General Secretary. Only the necessary funds for branch salaries and 
office overhead find their way to the branch or régional offices .Thus the 
financial power or strength in the unions rests at the national union level 
and is controlled by the National General Secretaries. 
Most of the General Secretaries complain of the fact that their union 
is financially weak. Table 2 testifies to this fact. While the relative finan-
cial position of the Kenyan unions has significantly improved over the 
ten year period, their total current expenditure per member was only 
équivalent to $3.95 for the year 1972 while their total assets were only 
équivalent to $2.87 per member. It can therefore be concluded that union 
financing, or the lack thereof, is a major weakness of the unions in Kenya. 
Speaking gênerally it means (a) unions do not provide any form of finan-
cial assistance to their strikers, (b) except for a few unions, the enroll-
ing of new members is the responsibility of the Organizing Secretaries 
and the part-time (generally non-paid) branch chairmen and shop ste-
wards (c) relatively few unions offer any services other than bargaining 
and grievance handling to the members, (d) no union employs trained 
économie advisors and only a couple of unions hâve either a full or part-
time research départaient, and e) the majority of the unions are really 
« one man shows > with the General Secretary doing ail the bargaining, 
handling ail major grievances, resolving the many branch problems that 
occur as well as administering the union. 
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THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS 
The Législative Framework 
In 1965 the Government passed the Trade Disputes Act to regulate 
collective bargaining relationships in both the private and public sectors. 
To the disappointment of some unionists, this Act did little to change 
the restrictive législative framework which existed prior to Independence. 
Tom Mboya who was the Minister for Labour at the time felt that 
the trade unions h ad to take a positive rôle in development during the 
post-independence period. As he stated 
« The new Government is not prepared to allow any obstruction in 
the economic development either from trade unions or any other 
groups of persons. » 18 
Thus it is not surprising to find that the Trade Disputes Act served to 
place a number of restrictions upon the trade unions' collective bar-
gaining activities. This Act was later amended in 1971 to give both the 
Minister of Labour and the Industrial Court wider powers over the col-
lective bargaining process. 
In return for the limitations placed upon their right to strike, the 
Trade Disputes Act also contained provisions for a compulsory check-off 
System. According to the Act employers with more than four union 
members are responsible for remitting monthly union dues directly to 
the union's headoffice. This provision has been extremely important for 
the growth and stability of the union movement in Kenya. For the first 
time they could rely on a minimum level of financial security. 
The provisions of the statute do not corne into effect unless a dis-
pute has been declared between the parties, and the issue referred to the 
Minister of Labour. The statute is silent concerning procédures to be 
followed up to this point. As such, union and management enter into a 
« récognition agreement » which, in addition to specificaUy recognizing 
the union as the bargaining représentative, outlines the procédure the 
parties agrée to follow during negotiations. Only if there is a breakdown 
in thèse negotiations is the issue referred to the Minister of Labour. 
18 Tom MBOYA, The Challenge of Nationhood, London, Heinemann, 1970, 
p. 66. 
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Once a dispute is referred to the Minister a Tripartite Committee 
is consulted and, on their recommendation, the Minister may (a) appoint 
a conciliator, (b) appoint an investigator, (c) refer the issue back to the 
parties, (d) reject the dispute, or (e) refer the dispute directly to the 
Industrial Court. Normally in ail cases of « interest » disputes the Min-
ister appoints a conciliator and in ail « rights » disputes he appoints an 
investigator. Only if the conciliators fail, or if the parties reject the in-
vestigator's recommendation, will the Minister normally refer the matter 
to the Industrial Court. 
The Act clearly states that the Industrial Court's reinstatement awards 
are enforced and it also states that the Minister may order the enforce-
ment of an award, but it does not suggest that the Court's award are final 
and binding. This uncertainty of the « final and binding » nature of In-
dustrial Court's awards has created some problems for unions and man-
agement but so far in only a very few cases. 20 
Thus the negotiation procédure is quite clear in that it provides for 
voluntary negotiation, conciliation, and if necessary, referral to the In-
dustrial Court. The only time limit in this entire procédure is a 21 day 
period within which the Minister must act after a dispute has been referred 
to him. The lack of time limits in the procédure is another problem with 
the current législation. 
The statute explicitly recognises the employées' right to strike in 
that it does outline the conditions under which a strike shall be unlawful. 
There are really only two instances whereby a strike is clearly lawful. 
The first is if a dispute has been referred to the Minister and the Minister 
fails to refer it to conciliation, investigation, etc. within 21 days. The 
second instance is where the Industrial Court has made its award but 
the employer refuses to implement it and as such the union has ex-
hausted ail available procédures. Notwithstanding the foregoing, how-
ever the Minister has the power to déclare any actual or threatened strike 
to be unlawful or to require the parties to comply with an award. 
19 ibid. p. 63. 
20
 H. WAMALWA, «The System of Settling Disputes in Kenya» Conciliation 
and Arbitration of Industrial Disputes in English Speaking Countries of Africa, 
Geneva, ILO, Labour Management Séries 37, 1970, p. 110. 
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The Structure For Negotiations 
Management in Kenya is quite well organized for collective bargain-
ing purposes. In addition to the major employer's association — the Féd-
ération of Kenya Employers (F.K.E.) — there are also numerous ré-
gional, trade and industry employer's associations. The primary fmiction 
of ail thèse associations is to unité employers for collective bargaining pur-
poses. Most of the bargaining is conducted between an individual union 
and one of the associations. The fact that there are fewer than two hundred 
registered collective agreements in Kenya testifies to the effectiveness 
of thèse associations. Thus the majority of the collective agreements are 
negotiated on behalf of management for a group of employers, gênerally 
by a negotiator who is employed full time by either the FKE or one of 
the other associations. 
Unlike management, the unions hâve not been able to organize a 
united front for collective bargaining. Most unions do not consider COTU 
to be an effective source of assistance in the areas of collective bar-
gaining and dispute seulement. The conséquence is that each union 
chooses to bargain without any outside help and therefore is uriable to 
corne to the bargaining table with the same backing and resources as 
management. 
Negotiations for the union are handled by the General Secretary, 
who is accompanied by a coterie of union executive. However, it is clear 
that the General Secretary is the spokesman and makes the final décisions. 
In most cases this means he has the final say on contract terms without 
the need for ratification by the membership. 
The Kenyan Strike Record 
One of the effects of the collective bargaining process can be seen 
in the strike record for the years 1963 to 1972 as reported in Table 
3. 21 As indicated in the first column, there has been a sharp réduction 
in the number of strikes in Kenya since the passage of the Trade Disputes 
Act in 1965. From 1963 to 1965 there was an average of 233 strikes 
per year, while the average for the last seven years is 100 per year. 
21
 The data presented in tables will differ from that published by the Kenya 
Government. Certain errors were found in published data which required correc-
tions. The figures hâve been agreed upon as correct by the Government officiais 
and the authors. It should be noted that in Kenya ail labour disputes regardless of 
duration or numbers involved are classified as strikes and included in the tables. 
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TABLE 3 
Industrial Disputes — 1963-1972 
Year Number of Strikes Workers Involved Man-Days Lost 
1963 282 54,881 191,023 
1964 231 67,038 158,060 
1965 186 82,250 286,071 
1966 130 42,554 130,574 
1967 129 30,160 110,903 
1968 93 20,428 50,003 
1969 110 33,718 109,092 
1970 79 18,739 58,720 
1971 69 13,553 32,778 
1972 94 27,510 42,006 
Source : Ministry of Labour Records and Files, 1963-1972. 
Similarly, other measures indicates an identical pattern. The average 
number of man-days lost as a resuit of strikes declined from an annual 
average of 211,718 for the 1963-1965 period to 76,296 for the period 
from 1966 onward. And the number of workers involved in strikes de-
clined from an average of 68,056 for the years 1963-1965 to an average 
26,666 for the years 1966-1972. 
Table 4 shows one of the most important characteristics of strikes 
in Kenya — strikes only last for short periods. While strikes in Kenya 
hâve always been of short duration, this has been more the case since 
1965. The absolute number of strikes of 48 hours or more has fallen 
from an average of 26 prior to passage of the législation to an average 
of four since 1965. Thus after 1965 the yearly average number of strikes 
longer than 48 hours was only five per cent of ail strikes. We feel that 
this situation may be attributed to the following four factors. First most 
of thèse strikes are illégal and therefore can only be short before there 
is police or government intervention. ^ A second factor is the unions 
inability to pay strikers and most workers hâve no savings to fall back 
upon. This problem is further aggravated by high unemployment making 
it difficult for strikers to find another job. Thirdly, many strikes are 
« wildcat » and are called without the support of the national union 
and are often resolved by the General Secretary sending the strikers back 
to work. Finally by far the majority of the strikes are over grievances 
2 2
 The Government takes a fairly libéral attitude toward thèse illégal strikes 
and as long as they are of short duration it does not prosecute the unions. 
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or « rights » issues rather than bargaining or « interest » issues and such 
rights disputes can often be resolved fairly quickly. 
TABLE 4 
Duration of Industriel Disputes in Hours — 1963-1972 
0 — 8 9 — 48 over 48 
Year n % n % n % 
1963 119 42.2 130 46.1 33 11.7 
1964 101 43.7 108 46.7 22 9.5 
1965 91 48.9 73 39.2 22 11.8 
1966 74 56.9 52 40.0 4 3.1 
1967 53 41.1 65 50.2 11 8.5 
1968 41 44.1 49 52.7 3 3.2 
1969 50 45.5 57 51.8 3 2.7 
1970 42 53.2 31 39.2 6 7.6 
1971 28 40.6 35 50.7 6 8.7 
1972 58 61.7 34 36.2 2 2.1 
Source '. : Ministry of Labour Records and Files, 1963-1972. 
In Table 5 strikes are classified as « rights » or grievance disputes 
and « interest » or bargaining disputes. By far the majority of strikes 
in Kenya hâve always been over rights issues. The limited nature of 
the issues involved in such cases means they can be resolved more rapidly 
than interest disputes, which hâve a broader scope and wider ramifications. 
Since the passage of the Trade Disputes Act there has been a noticable 
decrease in the proportion of strikes over interest issues. Thus one can 
observe that the collective bargaining procédure and the Industrial Court 
hâve been quite effective in dealing with those disputes which cause the 
greatest disruption to the economy. 
DISCUSSION 
As pointed out in the introduction Fisher, a décade ago, argued that 
unions in developing countries are faced with three alternatives : (a) to 
become instruments of the state, (b) to oppose government policies, or 
(c) to accept a policy of wage and other restraints. The first alternative 
means a décline of politically and economically independent unions and 
the second requires a power base that most unions in developing coun-
tries do not hâve. By following the third alternative, a union movement 
may be able to survive and develop its power base until economic and 
490 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 29 , NO 3 
TABLE 5 
Classification of Strikes as to « Rights » or 
«Interest » Disputes, 1963-1972 
« Rights » or Grievance « Interest » or 
Strikes Bargaining Strikes 
Year n % n % 
1963 190 67 92 33 
1964 181 78 50 22 
1965 129 69 57 31 
1966 108 83 22 17 
1967 102 79 27 21 
1968 85 91 8 9 
1969 88 80 22 20 
1970 71 90 8 10 
1971 56 81 13 19 
1972 84 89 10 11 
Source : Ministry of Labour Records and Files, 1963-1972. 
political conditions allow it to more actively follow an independent po-
licy. In doing so it may also be able to follow an active policy that im-
proves its position and not just accept the crumbs thrown to it by the 
government. The trade union movement in Kenya has followed Fisher's 
third alternative and we hâve used the Kenya example £0 show the im-
plications of such policy. In so doing we believe that the controls placed 
upon unions are intended to stabilize the economy, attract foreign invest-
ment, maximize the development goals of the government and minimize 
the political involvement of the unions. In the following discussion we 
will consider the ramifications of thèse controls. 
To eliminate conflict in the union movement, which spilled over into 
the political arena, the Central Organization of Trade Unions was estab-
lished by Presidential decree in 1965. This decree forced the amal-
gamation of the Kenya African Workers Union and the Kenya Fédération 
of Labour. However the old rivalries are still carried on but, now within 
the confines of COTU. The conséquence has been to weaken COTU 
such that it is not able to provide much assistance to the struggling national 
unions. 
In establishing COTU the government ensured they would be able 
to hâve a continuing influence on the internai affairs of COTU. The 
Government's influence over the internai affairs of the unions is main-
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tained through the following three requirements. First the Président of 
the Republic appoints the COTU Chairman, General Secretary and 
Deputy General Secretary. While the national unions vote to elect the 
officiais and the Président has always appointed the winners, il: is not 
mandatory for him to do so. At the time of writing (almost Wi years 
later) the men elected in 1972 still await appointaient by the Président. 
Therefore, this requirement could be used to ensure that union leaders 
with views in opposition to the government could be refused appoint-
ment to their elected positions. 
A second requirement is that the Minister of Labour has a repré-
sentative on both the Governing Council and the Executive Board of 
COTU — which are its major policy making bodies. Therefore, not only 
are the opinions of the government given before union policy is formu-
lated, but also the Minister is kept well informed on the union move-
ment's position on crucial economic or political issues. 
The third requirement is that, while unions in Kenya are free to 
organize, to gain officiai status they must be registered with the Registrar 
of Trade Unions. Part of this requirement is approval of the union's 
constitution. An examination of the union constitutions in Kenya reveals 
that they are virtually identical. The reason for this is that the Attorney-
Generals départaient has drafted a model constitution and, to be re-
gistered, unions must follow this model fairly closely. Such a procédure 
does hâve the advantage of ensuring that there are provisions in the 
constitution to adequately protect members' interest. But it also provides 
a mechanism whereby the government can influence both the structure 
and the internai affairs of the trade unions. This has been especially 
the case in récent months with COTU. In 1971 and 1972 many problems 
were encountered in disputes over the COTU élections. Thèse problems 
arose over the system of représentation and the method of élections spe-
cified in the COTU constitution. To rectify the situation the Industrial 
Court recommended changes be made in the constitution. However, the 
revised constitution is being prepared by the office of the Attorney-
General and the only position COTU has is to make comments on the 
draft version. 
In addition to controls over the internai affairs of the unions, the 
Government has also restricted collective bargaining relationships in 
Kenya. According to the présent législation unions may only déclare a 
légal strike if the Minister of Labour fails to take action (i.e. refer the 
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dispute to conciliation) within twenty-one days or if the employer fails 
or refuses to implement an Industrial Court award. Even in thèse rather 
rare instances the Minister may still déclare any strike illégal. It may 
therefore be impossible for the trade unions to exert pressure through 
a légal strike. The same basic procédure is used for both interest and 
rights disputes. So far the procédure seems to be effective in the case 
of interest disputes which hâve declined as a proportion of total strikes 
since the passage of the Act. However the procédure does not appear 
adéquate for rights disputes. This type of conflict requires a more im-
médiate solution which the procédures do not provide. As a resuit unions 
must either accept the employer's offer or risk an illégal strike. So far the 
government has not prosecuted such illégal strikes because of their limited 
scope and short duration. Thus the overall resuit has been a réduction of 
strikes in Kenya and most of those that do occur are illégal and over rights 
issues. It should also be noted that the other sources of union power such 
as sympathy strikes or secondary boycotts are specifically precluded by 
législation, and implicitly so is picketing. 
While unions in Kenya face a number of constraints, imposed by 
the Government, they hâve obtained some benefits as well. One of the 
most serious problems unions in a developing country face is adéquate 
financing. This makes it impossible for them to obtain staff of the same 
quantity or quality as does management, or to develop a strike fund. The 
unions hâve received a large measure of relief in this area from the 
check-off System introduced as one of the major trade-offs received by 
the unions for the restriction contained in the 1965 Trade Disputes Act. 
The financial position of the unions is still far from strong, but one 
wonders what it would be without the check-off System. 
In our view the establishment of the Industrial Court has had bén-
éficiai conséquences for the unions. A view that is also supported by the 
unions General Secretaries. The majority of contracts are settled outside 
the Court, but the Court awards offer a référence for other awards. Also 
the Court provides a déterrent to an employer who seeks to force a low 
wage seulement since the union can simply process the issue to the Court. 
By acting as an independent arbitrator, the Court has operated to offset 
the power imbalance between management and unions which is perhaps 
why the union leaders interviewed strongly support the System. 
By choosing a policy along the lines of Fisher's third alternative, 
unions in Kenya hâve been severely restricted but at the same time hâve 
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been able to achieve a sustained and stable growth. By choosing this al-
ternative they hâve been able to continue building a power base and 
more experienced leadership so that as the economy becomes v/ealthier 
the unions will be in a position to adopt a more independent policy. To 
hâve done otherwise could well hâve led to their démise. 
Some of the background factors which seem of importance to the 
shaping of the Kenya situation are as follows. At the time of Indepen-
dence a viable union movement existed which had its power base devel-
oped in the fight for Independence. To eliminate such a group would 
hâve been too disruptive to an economy seeking stability internally and 
in the eyes of foreign investors. Also a number of major political leaders 
had a power base in the union movement and did not want to see it wiped 
out, even though they no longer wanted the unions to take an active 
political rôle. However, the unions were not sufficiently strong to engage 
in a confrontation with the government. The resuit has been a compro-
mise with the unions facing restrictions but also receiving some benefits. 
This compromise leading to the reconciliation of the Government's de-
velopment goals and the union's economic goals seems to be working 
for now because management does not like strikes, the workers cannot 
afford them and so long as they are short the government is not getting 
too concerned. If the union's financial strength were to improve or if the 
parties' confidence in the Industrial Court was to change, this compro-
mise may not continue to be successful. 
We fear that current actions by the Government may alter the exist-
ing situation. Kenya is currently feeling the Worldwide problem of in-
flation. It is attempting to remedy the situation through traditional 
application of price and income policies. As such, in September, 1973, 
the Government invoked clauses 8(c), 8(d) and 10 of the 1971 amend-
ment to the Trades Disputes Act. Thus the Industrial Court is now bound 
by any guidelines or other directives' relating to wage levels or other 
terms and conditions of work that may be issued by the Minister of Fi-
nance. In addition, in the future ail agreements must be registered by the 
Court and only those which comply with the incomes policy are to be 
registered. No collective agreement is to take effect until it is registered 
by the Industrial Court. Thus the Court is to become an executive arm 
for implementing a Government incomes policy. It is likely that this 
action will destroy the confidence and independent réputation of the 
Court. But what can the trade unions do about it — absolutely nothing ! 
They do not hâve either the political or economic power to force the 
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Government into changing its position. Even if they strike and exercise 
force on a company, the agreement still must be registered with the In-
dustrial Court and conform to the Governments incomes policy. 
In conclusion we reiterate that the Kenyan expérience suggest that 
the trade unions in the developing countries hâve no choice. They must 
accept a policy of wage restraint. The économie development and poli-
tical goals of the Government are going to take priority. Governments 
can not and will not allow the trade unions to exercise « power » which 
will hinder or limit the development goals of the Government. As in 
Kenya, the Govemment's potential degree of control over the trade union 
movement is great. The degree to which this potential is exercised is dé-
pendent upon the actions and militancy of the trade unions themselves. 
The choice left to the unions may be to accept a policy of wage restraint 
or be taken over and become an arm of the government. 
La puissance syndicale et le processus 
du développement économique: 
l'exemple du Kenya 
Tous les gouvernements imposent des restrictions à l'activité des syndicats, 
mais le degré et la forme en varient d'un pays à l'autre. Un facteur qu'on considère 
de première importance dans la détermination de ces restrictions repose sur l'éten-
due du développement économique du pays en cause. Certains soutiennent qu'un 
mouvement syndical fort est de nature à retarder le progrès des nations en voie 
de développement ; d'autres estiment que les syndicats peuvent contribuer à la for-
mation d'une main-d'œuvre stable et efficace. Toutefois, même les tenants de ce 
dernier point de vue ne rejettent pas toute restriction. 
Le but du présent article est d'analyser les différentes attitudes que peuvent 
adopter les gouvernements et les centrales syndicales en regard de cette question 
et les auteurs, pour y arriver, se sont penchés sur les rapports qui existent entre 
l'État et le syndicalisme dans un pays africain, le Kenya. Ils ont voulu voir com-
ment le gouvernement de ce pays a cherché à réconcilier ses objectifs de dévelop-
pement économique avec la concession aux syndicats du droit de grève, du droit 
de négociation collective et du droit d'association. Le Kenya se prêtait d'autant 
mieux à cette étude que le mouvement syndical y est bien implanté et qu'on y fait 
de grands efforts pour développer aussi rapidement que possible un secteur indus-
triel moderne. Longtemps colonie britannique, indépendant depuis au-delà de dix 
ans, le Kenya est aussi politiquement stable. 
Dans tout État, il s'établit des rapports étroits entre le gouvernement et le 
mouvement syndical et, dans une large mesure, la nature de ces relations dépend 
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de l'intensité de l'opposition aux politiques gouvernementales. Dans les pays en 
voie de développement, les syndicats, face à l'État, peuvent adopter trois attitudes : 
devenir simplement les instruments du gouvernement, s'unir à l'opposition pour 
combattre le parti au pouvoir, accepter la voie du compromis qui se traduit en 
pratique par le contrôle des salaires et une législation plus ou moins contraignante. 
En réalité, la situation oscille entre deux pôles : pour l'État, permettre un certain 
degré de syndicalisme efficace et sacrifier la croissance économique ou supprimer 
toute vie démocratique et pousser au maximum le développement de l'industrie ; 
pour le mouvement syndical : en venir à disparaître à plus ou moins long terme 
ou tomber entre les mains de groupes radicalisés. 
Comme la plupart des pays en voie de développement étaient autrefois des 
colonies, au moment de l'indépendance nationale les gouvernements ont hérité 
d'une assise industrielle et d'un certain nombre d'institutions déjà établies. On ne peut 
pas balayer tout cela sans danger. Comment agir alors ? Au Kenya, syndicats et 
gouvernements ont choisi de s'engager dans la voie du compromis. En acceptant 
de travailler selon cette formule, les syndicats ont réussi parfois à obtenir certains 
avantages qui ont favorisé le recrutement des membres. 
Au Kenya, les syndicats n'ont été reconnus qu'à partir de 1943. Auparavant, 
la législation était de caractère essentiellement restrictif de telle sorte qu'il n'existait 
aucun mouvement syndical. Après la guerre, le gouvernement britannique a mani-
festé un peu d'intérêt pour les problèmes de travailleurs africains tout en s'efforçant 
de limiter l'activité des syndicats aux questions sociales et économiques. C'était 
l'époque où le mouvement de l'idée d'indépendance commençait à se répandre et, 
au cours de cette période, il est devenu difficile de différencier l'activité économique 
des syndicats de leur combat en faveur de la libération. Dans bien des cas, les chefs 
du mouvement syndical et du mouvement d'indépendance se concentraient dans les 
mêmes personnes. Pour contrecarrer l'action des syndicats, le gouvernement colo-
nial favorisa l'établissement de comités de travailleurs, institua un mécanisme de 
fixation des salaires, s'efforça de contrôler l'activité interne des syndicats et géné-
ralisa l'arbitrage obligatoire des conflits. 
Peu avant l'accession à l'indépendance, un gouvernement de coalition fut formé 
au sein duquel le Secrétaire général de la Fédération du travail du Kenya devint 
ministre du travail. Celui-ci institua un comité tripartite qui mit au point une charte 
industrielle par laquelle les employeurs s'engageaient à reconnaître les syndicats 
et à négocier collectivement et les syndicats, à diminuer le nombre des conflits du 
travail. 
À l'indépendance, comme les conflits étaient surtout attribuables à la rivalité 
entre les deux centrales syndicales existantes, le gouvernement fusionna les deux 
organisations et défendit aux syndicats de s'affilier aux mouvements syndicaux 
étrangers. Les statuts de la nouvelle centrale furent rédigés par le Procureur général 
du pays et imposèrent la surveillance du gouvernement sur ses affaires internes. À 
cette époque, la centrale et ses dirigeants prêtèrent allégeance au gouvernement et 
accordèrent leur appui au parti au pouvoir. Depuis lors, les syndicats se sont déve-
loppés, mais on ne peut pas en dire autant de la centrale elle-même. Les syndicats, 
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qui sont au nombre de trente, conduisent leurs propres affaires. Ils remplissent la 
triple fonction de recruter des membres, de négocier collectivement et de régler 
les griefs. D'une façon générale, le pouvoir au sein de chaque syndicat est centralisé 
entre les mains du secrétaire général, qui est habituellement élu pour cinq ans. Les 
syndicats comptent beaucoup de membres inscrits mais beaucoup moins de mem-
bres cotisants de telle sorte que la plupart des secrétaires généraux se plaignent 
que leur situation financière est faible. 
Les auteurs, après avoir analysé la législation du travail actuelle et examiné 
le dossier des grèves, font porter leurs observations sur les trois choix cités au 
début : devenir les instruments du gouvernement, combattre les politiques gouver-
nementales ou accepter une politique des salaires et d'autres contraintes. 
Le premier choix entraîne un déclin de l'indépendance politique et économique 
des syndicats et le deuxième exige une force dont ils ne disposent pas encore dans 
les pays en voie de développement. En se portant sur le troisième choix, un mou-
vement syndical peut survivre et accroître graduellement sa puissance jusqu'à ce 
que les conditions politiques et économiques lui permettent de montrer plus d'indé-
pendance. Au Kenya, le mouvement syndical s'est engagé dans cette troisième voie 
et, de l'expérience qui s'en dégage, on peut déduire que les restrictions imposées 
aux syndicats visaient à stabiliser l'économie, à attirer les capitaux étrangers, à 
maximiser les objectifs de développement recherchés par l'État et à minimiser l'en-
gagement politique des syndicats. Ce sont les raisons fondamentales pour lesquelles 
le gouvernement a voulu exercer une influence constante sur les affaires internes 
du mouvement syndical, notamment en se donnant le pouvoir de désigner lui-même 
ses principaux dirigeants et d'imposer la présence d'un représentant du gouverne-
ment au consetil exécutif. 
Les auteurs concluent enfin de l'expérience kénienne que les syndicats n'ont 
qu'un seul choix dans les pays en voie de développement : accepter une politique 
de restriction en matière de salaires. Les gouvernements ne peuvent pas permettre 
et ne permettent pas aux syndicats d'exercer un « pouvoir » qui entraverait la pour-
suite de leurs objectifs économiques. Le contrôle de l'État sur le syndicalisme est 
considérable et celui-ci est forcé d'accepter certaines restrictions sous peine de dis-
paraître ou de devenir un simple appareil du gouvernement. 
